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3 The Great Depression as a 
Historical Problem
Michael A. Bernstein 
University of California, San Diego
It is now over a half-century since the Great Depression of the 
1930s, the most severe and protracted economic crisis in American his 
tory. To this day, there exists no general agreement about its causes, 
although there tends to be a consensus about its consequences. Those 
who at the time argued that the Depression was symptomatic of a pro 
found weakness in the mechanisms of capitalism were only briefly 
heard. After World War II, their views appeared hysterical and exag 
gerated, as the industrialized nations (the United States most prominent 
among them) sustained dramatic rates of growth and as the economics 
profession became increasingly preoccupied with the development of 
Keynesian theory and the management of the mixed economy. As a 
consequence, the economic slump of the inter-war period came to be 
viewed as a policy problem rather than as an outgrowth of fundamental 
tendencies in capitalist development. Within that new context, a debate 
persisted for a few years, but it too eventually subsided. The presump 
tion was that the Great Depression could never be repeated owing to 
the increasing sophistication of economic analysis and policy formula 
tion. Indeed, the belief became commonplace that the business cycle 
was "tamed" and "obsolete."
The erratic performance of the American economy since the early 
1970s has made this notion itself seemingly obsolete. Serious ques 
tions have been raised concerning the political obstacles to the effec 
tive management of cyclical instability and, as well, our skill in 
diagnosing and correcting economic maladies. Indeed, entirely new 
varieties of economic thinking have emerged, which have argued that 
the government cannot alter levels of real output (let alone rates of 
increase in output) except under exceptional circumstances that involve 
the execution of consistently inaccurate (or irrational) forecasts by eco-
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nomic agents and/or the implementation of fiscal and monetary poli 
cies without the anticipation of the private sector. The confidence of 
the Keynesian Revolution has been shaken. A new "classicism" has 
come to prominence in economic thought.
In this climate of economic opinion, it is important to note that the 
optimism of the post-World War II era regarding the mixed economy 
and the new economics of Keynesianism had emerged at a time of dra 
matic reconstruction in the world economy and concomitant prosperity 
in the American. Such hope had been absent in the decade of the Great 
Depression; even during the war years there had been great apprehen 
sion that a return to depression would come close on the heels of vic 
tory. But the high growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s obscured the 
pre-war debates and dissolved for the moment any fears of a return to 
hard times.
Yet the concerns and misgivings of the depression and war years, 
far from being resolved, simply faded from view. While it has by now 
long been fashionable to claim that "Keynes is dead," and that alto 
gether novel approaches to economic policy formulation must be 
developed, it has nevertheless been deemed passe to engage with the 
ideas and theses of an older generation of economists who struggled to 
understand strange and devastating events at a time when orthodox the 
ories and remedies no longer sufficed. Indeed, the vast majority of 
contemporary economists have grown decidedly hostile to arguments 
concerning the Great Depression that have not focused on the short run 
or on policy failure. In this respect they have avoided the structural, 
institutional, and long-run perspectives—more characteristic of their 
forebears—that sought to situate the great economic crisis of the inter- 
war years within a historical framework that spanned several decades 
or more. By so doing, they have lost an appreciation not simply of 
some possible causes of the Great Depression itself, but also of the 
subsequent development and performance of the American economy 
since mid-century. It is for this reason that I seek, through a reassess 
ment of particular aspects of these older analytical approaches, to per 
suade you of the usefulness and insight afforded by an understanding 
of "The Great Depression as a Historical Problem."
The older literature concerning the Great Depression in the United 
States may be broadly classified into three categories. The first argued 
that the severity and length of the downturn was the direct result of the
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collapse of financial markets that began in 1929. The main emphasis 
of such work concerned the causes of the 1929 crash and those factors 
that amplified its impact. The second concluded that the economic 
calamity of the 1930s was the direct result of poorly formulated and 
politically distorted actions undertaken by the government. The third 
category took a broader perspective and attempted to analyze the 
Depression in a long-run context. It suggested that whatever the ori 
gins of the slump, the reasons for its unparalleled length and severity 
predated and transcended the events of the last quarter of 1929. To this 
third category of analysis I shall devote most of my attention—but first 
I would like to survey the general arguments characteristic of those 
economists who focused on short-run dynamics and policy failure.
All short-run analyses of the Great Depression shared a common 
attribute. They focused on the immediate causes and impacts of the 
stock market collapse in 1929, and they asserted that the precipitous 
devaluation of wealth and the disruption of the banking system occa 
sioned by it explained the intensity of the crisis. The "business confi 
dence" thesis was perhaps the best example of this school of thought. 
It held that regardless of the mechanisms that caused the collapse, the 
dramatic slide of the stock market created intensely pessimistic expec 
tations in the business community. The shock to confidence was so 
severe and unexpected that a dramatic panic took hold, stifling invest 
ment and thereby a full recovery. 1
A more comprehensive formulation of the short-run argument 
directly confronted the question of why financial markets collapsed. 
Looking to the political and institutional distortions created by the 
Treaty of Versailles, some writers (such as Irving Fisher, Lionel Rob- 
bins, and Jacob Viner) argued that the Depression was the inevitable 
consequence of the chaotic and unstable credit structure of the 1920s. 
World finances, of course, were significantly destabilized by the provi 
sions of the Versailles Treaty itself. The principal irritant consisted of a 
dangerous circle of obligations and risks in which (as epitomized by 
the Dawes Plan of 1924) the United States lent funds to Great Britain, 
France, and Germany, while German reparations were needed to allow 
the Allies to liquidate their American debts. By 1928, American banks 
were already quite wary of the situation. Yet their predictable and 
understandable response, cutting back on loans to European govern 
ments, merely made the situation worse. Moreover, the demise of the
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gold standard in international trade, and the demands by France and 
the United States that Germany make her reparations payments in gold 
rather than in the export of goods and services, created a net gold flow 
into the United States that led to a veritable explosion of credit. 
Extremely unstable credit arrangements thereby emerged in the 1920s, 
especially in mortgage markets. Given the relatively unregulated envi 
ronment at the time, many banks were committed to questionable loan 
contracts. Once the crash came, the collapse of the banking system 
was quick to follow. Thus, excessive credit and speculation coupled 
with a weak banking network caused the Great Depression. 2
Another version of the short-run argument concerned the immedi 
ate effects of the crash on consumer wealth and spending. The severity 
of the downturn, it was argued, resulted in a drastic devaluation of con 
sumer wealth and incomes. The large stress placed on the capital mar 
kets and the lack of consumer confidence in banks ensured that 
effective demand could not be bolstered by increased credit. The large 
decreases in purchasing power, which emerged directly from the crash, 
left the economy saddled with excess capacity and inadequate 
demand. 3
None of these short-run arguments were completely convincing or 
satisfying. Inasmuch as the business confidence thesis was subjective, 
it was virtually impossible to evaluate in the light of historical evi 
dence. This weakness was perhaps best exemplified by the claim of 
Gustav Cassel who, in focusing on psychological factors in the slump, 
argued that "American puritanism stands out as perhaps the most 
important [example] . . . the stock exchange speculation of 1928-29 
was regarded as particularly sinful behavior which had to get its pun 
ishment." There was also the major theoretical objection to notions 
like these that they mistook effect for cause, given that the objective 
circumstances of the 1930s may have generated the subjective 
responses of pessimism and panic. Such theories could not, therefore, 
occupy a central place in explanations of the Depression. 4
The excessive credit and speculation argument was frequently 
rejected on the grounds that it abstracted too boldly from real rather 
than monetary events in the inter-war economy. Indeed, business cycle 
indicators turned down before the stock market crashed; indices of 
industrial production started to fall by the summer of 1929, and a soft 
ness in construction activity was apparent in 1928. Such critics as John
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Kenneth Galbraith held that "cause and effect run from the economy to 
the stock market, never the reverse. Had the economy been fundamen 
tally sound in 1929 the effect of the great stock market crash might 
have been small . . . the shock to confidence and the loss of spending 
by those who were caught in the market might soon have worn off." 5
As for the wealth and spending hypothesis, the evidence did not 
provide a compelling proof. The dramatic decline in consumption 
expenditures after 1929 may have been due to the wealth effects of the 
stock market debacle; it may have arisen once expectations had been 
dampened by the events after 1929; or it may have been an outgrowth 
of a declining trend in construction activity and in farm incomes during 
the 1920s. But even recent econometric investigations have been inca 
pable of unambiguously explaining a large portion of the decline in 
spending. We can speak of an autonomous drop, but we cannot say for 
sure why it happened.6
Another approach to understanding the Depression evaluated the 
extent to which the slump was the result of systematic policy errors. 
Inadequate theory and misleading information, as well as political 
pressures, it was argued, distorted the policymaking process. Such 
investigators as Melvin Brockie, Kenneth Roose, and Sumner Slichter 
maintained that from 1932 onwards the American economy showed a 
great potential for recovery, only to be set back profoundly by the 1936 
recession. They found that monetary conditions were not a factor inso 
far as the data showed low short-term interest rates, a strong bond mar 
ket, and a high incidence of excess reserves. It was the impact of the 
New Deal, they asserted, which was responsible for negating whatever 
monetary stimulus did exist because of the tendency of the Industrial 
Codes to raise labor costs and material input prices. The rhetoric and 
ideology of the Roosevelt administration may have also played a role 
by jeopardizing the confidence of the business community. 7 Not sur 
prisingly, several investigators (as well as journalists and pundits) 
labeled the downturn of 1936-37 the "Roosevelt Recession."
The monetarist criticism of New Deal policy, originally posed by 
Clark Warburton but most persuasively presented by Milton Friedman 
and Anna Schwartz, focused on the impact of the external dollar drain 
generated by Great Britain's departure from the gold standard in 1931 
and the internal drain created by the crash itself. To the extent that the 
Federal Reserve Board failed to understand the links between bank
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failures, runs on deposits, and the international pressure on the dollar, 
it also failed to recognize the inappropriateness of the classical policy 
response undertaken—the raising of discount rates. 8
It was not solely criticisms of actual government policy in which 
these writers indulged to explain the Depression's unusual severity. In 
some cases they also criticized the government for not doing enough. 
They maintained that the private sector moved too quickly in the mid 
1930s in raising prices. As a result, by 1937 consumers showed an 
increasing resistance to higher prices, owing to their desire to liquidate 
the large debt incurred earlier in the decade and to maintain their sav 
ings in uncertain times. The average propensity to consume subse 
quently fell and a recession took hold. 9 Pro-competitive policies 
presumably were the solution, but government action (such as the cre 
ation of the Temporary National Economic Committee to Investigate 
the Concentration of Economic Power) was too little, too late, and 
often inspired more by political than economic concerns.
The notion that the Great Depression was essentially an outgrowth 
of policy failures was problematic at best. To be sure, one could with 
the benefit of hindsight engage in some forceful criticism of economic 
policy during the 1930s, but it seems that was and is a futile exercise. 
After all, in many respects the Roosevelt administration (especially the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) did what many of 
its predecessors had done in the face of a cyclical downturn. One must 
ask, therefore, how government officials suddenly became so inept in 
the inter-war period. Moreover, the question remains: why were tradi 
tional policies that had seemingly worked in the past and that repre 
sented a theoretical consensus among generations of economists 
suddenly so perverse in the 1930s? What had changed in the structure 
and operation of the national economy in the inter-war period that 
made orthodox economic theory and policy inadequate?
While concern with the problem of economic instability has punc 
tuated the history of economic thought for several centuries, it is hardly 
surprising that the Great Depression of the 20th century inspired a vast 
literature on the issue of investment failure and the maladjustment of 
investment plans. 10 In particular, the persistence of the Depression and 
the over-a-decade-long weakening of economic performance that it 
caused prompted several investigators to formulate a "stagnation the 
sis" concerning mature capitalist economies; it is within this context
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that we can assess the work of those who regarded the crisis of the 
1930s as a secular phenomenon. To their investigations, I now turn.
The literature that focused on long-run factors in the American 
Depression was distinctive in holding that the New York stock mar 
ket crash of 1929 was less important than certain developments in the 
economy that had deleterious impacts throughout the inter-war 
period. Some authors—for example, Seymour Harris and Paul 
Sweezy—argued that during the 1920s the distribution of national 
income became increasingly skewed, lowering the economy's aggre 
gate average propensity to consume. Others, such as Charles Kindle- 
berger, W. Arthur Lewis, and Vladimir Timoshenko, focused on a 
secular shift in the terms of trade between primary products and man 
ufactured goods, due to the uneven development of the agricultural 
and industrial nations. This change in the terms of trade, they argued, 
created a credit crisis in world markets when bad crop yields obtained 
in 1929 and 1930. At the same time that agricultural economies were 
losing revenue because of poor harvests and declining world demand, 
the developed economies were contracting credit for the developing 
nations and imposing massive trade restrictions such as America's 
Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930. As the agricultural nations went into a 
slump, the industrialized countries (most notably the United States) 
lost a major market for their output. Hence, the downturn of 1929 
became more and more severe. 11
Industrial organization economists, Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means most prominent among them, sought an explanation of the 
Depression in the increasing extent of imperfect competition in the 
American economy of the early 20th century. 12 Downward inflexibility 
of prices after the crash of 1929, caused by the concentrated structure 
of American industry and the impact of labor unions, intensified the 
effective demand problem and prevented the price system from reach 
ing a new equilibrium at full employment. On the one side, "sticky 
prices" further limited the already-constrained purchasing power of 
consumers. On the other, to the extent that noncompetitive pricing pre 
dominated in the capital goods sector, producers were less willing to 
buy new plant and equipment. Excessive real wages, helped up by 
union pressure and New Deal policy, further contributed to persistent 
disequilibrium in labor markets. Price inflexibility thus inhibited the 
recovery of both final product demand and investment demand. 13
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There were several weaknesses in all these theories. Those authors 
who focused on an increasingly unequal distribution of income or on 
administered pricing did not marshal unambiguous evidence to make 
their case, nor did they specify precisely how such factors came to life 
in the inter-war economy. While Berle and Means claimed to have 
demonstrated a relative price inflexibility in concentrated economic 
sectors during the 1930s, their critics were unconvinced. Insofar as the 
aggregate price-level fell by one-third in the early 1930s, they argued, 
how inflexible could the general price system have been? The sticky 
prices thesis also relied on an assumption of perfect competition in all 
markets other than those where the imperfections existed. If this 
assumption were relaxed, the thesis did not hold. As Michal Kalecki 
pointed out, if "sticky wages" were responsible for the length of the 
Depression, it followed that a reduction in wages would have elimi 
nated the persistent disequilibrium. If, however, there were imperfec 
tions in product markets as well, a reduction in nominal wages would 
have lowered real wages, thereby exacerbating the effective demand 
crisis. Only if price adjustments were general and were followed 
instantaneously by increased investment would the sticky prices thesis 
concerning the 1930s hold. 14
The terms-of-trade argument similarly had a major flaw. The major 
weaknesses in the American economy of the inter-war period were 
domestic, and the collapse of demand on the part of primary product- 
exporting nations was not highly relevant. America's dependence on 
foreign markets was not significant in the inter-war years. During the 
1920s, exports as a share of the nation's gross national product had 
annually averaged only a bit over 5 percent. A fall in export demand 
then could not have played a major role in worsening or prolonging the 
Great Depression. 15
Continued research on secular mechanisms in the Great Depres 
sion necessarily relied upon the work of Joseph Schumpeter on cycli 
cal processes in modern economies. Schumpeter held that the inter- 
war period was an era in which three major cycles of economic activity 
in the United States (and Europe) coincidentally reached their nadir. 16 
These cycles were 1) the Kondratieff, a wave of 50 or more years asso 
ciated with the introduction and dispersion of major inventions; 2) the 
Juglar, a wave of approximately 10 years' duration that appeared to be
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linked with population movements; and 3) the Kitchin, a wave of about 
40 months' length that had the appearance of a typical inventory cycle.
Schumpeter's efforts were paralleled by those of Simon Kuznets 
and, more recently, Moses Abramovitz and Richard Easterlin. Kuznets 
was successful in documenting the existence of waves of some 15 to 20 
years in length. These periodic swings, according to Abramovitz, dem 
onstrated that in the United States and other industrialized countries 
"development during the 19th and early 20th centuries took the form of 
a series of surges in the growth of output and in capital and labor 
resources followed by periods of retarded growth." Significantly, 
"each period of retardation in the rate of growth of output. . . culmi 
nated in a protracted depression or in a period of stagnation in which 
business cycle recoveries were disappointing, failing to lift the econ 
omy to a condition of full employment or doing so only transiently." 17
Most, if not all, of the "Kuznets Cycle" literature was concerned 
with the explicit dating of the long swings that appeared in the data. It 
seemed clear that these swings involved changes in resource endow 
ments (including the size of population) and alterations in the intensity 
of resource utilization. 18 The specific behavioral mechanisms that 
could account for the Kuznets phenomenon (and its precise manifesta 
tion in the United States in the 1930s) were necessarily the focus of 
continued debate. It is in this context that we can understand the large 
literature on "secular stagnation."
Broadly speaking, the so-called stagnation theorists of this century 
grouped into those who evinced a "Schumpeterian pessimism" about 
the declining incidence of innovations and new technologies, and those 
who shared a "Keynes-Hansen pessimism" concerning the shrinkage 
of investment outlets owing to a decline in the rate of population 
growth. 19 Both groups agreed that stagnation or, as it was sometimes 
called, economic maturity involved a "decrease of the rate of growth of 
heavy industries and of building activity . . . [and] the slowing down of 
the rate of growth of the total quantity of production, of employment, 
and usually of population. It [also involved] the rising relative impor 
tance of consumer goods." They also believed that "the appearance of 
industrial maturity raisefd] profound questions concerning the ability 
of an enterprise system to produce a progressive evolution of the econ 
omy . . "20
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The "Keynes-Hansen" pessimism held that as population growth 
fell off and as major markets in housing, clothing, food, and services 
consequently contracted, outlets for new investment were quickly lim 
ited to those created by the introduction of new technology or new 
products. To the extent that recovery from a depression required 
investment outlays above and beyond the level of depreciation allow 
ances, an upturn would be dependent on the availability, in an adequate 
volume, of opportunities in new industries and processes. If these were 
not forthcoming, as some stagnation theorists believed was true of the 
1930s, the only avenue out of the slump would be deficit spending to 
augment consumer purchasing power. But political barriers to such 
government action in the thirties left many economies mired in an 
environment of excess capacity and inadequate demand. Needless to 
say, contrary to popular perceptions, it was not the New Deal that dem 
onstrated the efficacy of restitutive fiscal spending, but rather World 
War II. While hardly inspired by specific economic concerns, Presi 
dent Franklin Roosevelt's "Arsenal of Democracy" nevertheless con 
tained rather vivid policy lessons for economists, politicians, gov 
ernment officials, and the public at large. 21
There was a serious inadequacy in the arguments concerning eco 
nomic maturity and population growth. The theory conflated popula 
tion with effective demand. As one critic put it,
[i]t is sometimes maintained that the increase in population 
encourages investment because the entrepreneurs anticipate a 
broadening market. What is important, however, in this con 
text is not the increase in population but in purchasing power. 
The increase in the number of paupers does not broaden the 
market. For instance, increased population does not mean nec 
essarily a higher demand for houses: without an increase in the 
purchasing power the result may well be crowding of more 
people into the existing dwelling space. 22
"There is no rigid physical relation," another commentator declared, 
"between the number of families in the country and the amount and 
value of the housing they will pay to occupy. Demand depends not 
only on their number, but their incomes."23 A more systematic theory 
had to argue that, for secular reasons, the purchasing power of the pop 
ulation, rather than the size of the population itself, fell in advanced 
capitalist systems.
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Much like the population theory, the variant of the stagnation the 
ory that focused on the decline of innovation and technical change as a 
factor in the distress of the 1930s embodied many inconsistencies and 
questionable assertions. The lower rate of technical change and the 
decline in the number of major innovations, which were posited as a 
primary cause of the inability of the economy to recover in the course 
of the Great Depression, were deemed to be exogenous factors derived 
from the state of technical knowledge at the time. 24 Little justification 
of this position was offered. Furthermore, meager attention was given 
to a seeming contradiction in the argument. If during the 1930s little 
technical change took place, why did not the eventual reduction in the 
amount of capital equipment available (owing to firm exits and the 
periodic obsolescence of plant) result in a revival of capital goods out 
put?25
There was one further objection to the technology argument that 
was apparent to some of the stagnation theorists themselves. There 
was an implicit assumption that new innovations were always of the 
capital-using type; thus, had innovation occurred in the 1930s, net 
investment demand would have absorbed large capital outlays, thereby 
generating a robust upturn. But if innovations were capital-saving, this 
argument foundered. Heavy investment in earlier stages of economic 
growth (in, for example, railroads, motor cars, and housing) may have 
given way (in later periods) to newer forms of investment in manage 
rial technique and information processing. These latter innovations 
may not have absorbed very large amounts of investment expenditure 
at all. While they may have therefore improved the organization and 
efficiency of production, their impact on aggregate spending would not 
have been adequate to the task of systematic recovery. As Alvin 
Hansen succinctly put it in 1941, "[t]he transformation of a rural econ 
omy into a capitalistic one is something distinctly different from the 
further evolution of a society which has already reached the status of a 
fully-developed machine technique."26
It was the Austrian economist Josef Steindl who provided the most 
sophisticated version of the economy maturity idea. Not surprisingly, 
he did so in part by explicitly situating the Great Depression in the 
United States within a long-term development framework. His work 
linked economic stagnation directly with the behavior of capitalist 
enterprise, thereby avoiding the mechanistic qualities of many of the
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stagnation arguments as well as their frequent appeals to exogenous 
factors. Steindl's version of the maturity thesis was that long-run ten 
dencies toward capital concentration, inherent in capitalist develop 
ment over time, led to a lethargic attitude towards competition and 
investment. 27 Specifically, the emergence of concentrated markets 
made difficult, and in some cases impossible, the expulsion of excess 
capacity required for revival after a trough.
Steindl argued that in any given industry there existed a hierarchy 
of firms based upon the relative level of prime production costs. Such 
a hierarchy existed because firms would have grown at different rates, 
entered the industry at varying times, and therefore installed equipment 
of assorted degrees of cost-effectiveness given their past profit perfor 
mance (and their differential access to outside funds). The gross mar 
gin, £„ for the zth firm, therefore, could be expressed as:
where PI was the firm's output price, 7Z the level of output, and where 
w, LI, and MJ were respectively the wage rate, the size of the hired labor 
force, and the level of materials costs facing the firm. (Steindl 
assumed, at least initially, that the wage rate was not employer-spe 
cific.) This gross margin, Steindl held, was the fundamental competi 
tive resource of the firm. It provided internal funds for investment and 
the securing of outside loans. For Steindl it was obvious that the mag 
nitude of a firm's internal funds was often directly proportional to its 
ability to secure credit by means of bond sales, equity issues, and bank 
loans. This was primarily due, in his view, to the "good will" that was 
commonly associated with firm size. Larger firms clearly had access to 
funds (both internal and external) far in excess of those for smaller 
firms.
In addition, a larger gross margin would enable a firm to initiate 
sales and advertising efforts and quality campaigns (and, attendant 
upon this, product differentiation) that could possibly allow it to appro 
priate other (less powerful) firms' markets. Most important, the gross 
margin could provide the means with which a firm might innovate and 
apply technically superior methods to production. The resultant sav 
ings in costs would be the basis of price cuts to drive competitors out of
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the market. Smaller firms that could not introduce these superior tech 
niques would thereby experience a shrinkage in profit margins result 
ing from the price war. The inability of these firms to employ new 
techniques might simply be due to the fact that they could not pay the 
price to install them. In fact, to the extent that patent laws existed, they 
might not have the funds for research and development efforts to 
deploy new methods themselves.
Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the competitive process 
of which Steindl conceived. The ray VR expresses the cost hierarchy of 
the industry, with the most inefficient firms at the higher point of the 
ordinate—their output is lower, in keeping with the notion of their min 
imal share of the market. Assuming that a standard mark-up pricing 
rule is used in the industry, VW describes a gradient of prices that 
expresses the differences in costs incurred by the various firms. Trian 
gle RVW is thus the gross margin of the total industry. The hierarchy of 
profit margins becomes immediately apparent. The firms with the 
larger margins (owing to lower costs) have larger shares of the market 
by assumption. Assume that demand increases in the industry, with the 
leading firms expanding output to S' from S. Their large margins allow 
for the introduction of cost-cutting techniques at R'. Should the result 
ing increase in profit margins cause the leading firms to accumulate 
such that then" rate of expansion rises above the market rate, a price cut 
ensues in the struggle for a greater share of the market. At the new 
(lower) price level FN, the least efficient firms are forced out due to the 
excess of their production costs over the market price. Producers TH 
are thus eliminated.
Consider a situation where the market in question is more concen 
trated than in the foregoing case. Presumably, the cost differentials 
among firms are less severe insofar as, over time, a small number of 
firms have become dominant by means of similar technology, sales 
efforts, and so on. Thus, the spectrum of costs structures is now V'R\ 
not VR'. This being the case, the expulsion of a certain number of firms 
from the industry by a competitive drive for market share requires a 
larger price reduction than in the first case. The price level FN, suffi 
cient to expel producers TH before, now threatens the economic exist 
ence of no one. To expel firms TH, at this point, would require a 
further cut in the price level to F'N'. The unwillingness to engage in 
more severe price cutting of this kind stems from the fact that large
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SOURCE: Steindl (1976), p. 44 (Figure 3).
reductions in price can invite retaliation that may generate a downward 
spiral of the price structure in general. In other words, there is the risk 
that the market, to use modern business parlance, may be "spoiled."28
Price inflexibility in concentrated industries is intensified during 
depressions, and this has an important impact on the response of firms 
to economic fluctuations. The net revenue of firms tends to be so jeop 
ardized in a slump that strategies of price reduction are viewed as 
unfeasible. There may even be incentives to raise prices in order to 
compensate for the reduction in the volume of sales—resulting in what 
James Tobin once named, during the celebrated 1962 confrontation of 
the Kennedy administration with the national steel industry, the
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"Blough Effect." 29 For a given industry, therefore, the impact of a 
decline in the rate of growth (i.e., the aggregate rate of capital accumu 
lation) will depend on the extent to which the industry is concentrated. 
In a sector where the squeezing out of competitors is relatively easy, 
large declines in demand will result in the reduction of profit margins 
(for each firm) as prices are cut. By contrast, in a concentrated market, 
profit margins will tend to be inelastic in the face of reductions in 
demand.
At the macroeconomic level, the implications of inelastic profit 
margins for cyclical performance are most profound. Insofar as price 
reductions do not obtain in the event of a decline in the rate of growth, 
the necessary adjustment of sectoral rates of expansion to the aggregate 
rate will require reductions in the rate of capacity utilization. When 
viewed in terms of the sector as a whole, if prices are fixed, output 
must fall to bring gross margins down. If industrial structure were 
more competitive, excess capacity would not result from a decline in 
the accumulation rate; rather, prices would fall.
Reductions in capacity utilization imply not only declines in 
national income but also increases in unemployment. In the presence 
of underutilized capacity, firms will be increasingly disinclined to 
undertake any net investment. A cumulative process is thereby estab 
lished wherein a decline in the rate of growth, by generating reductions 
in the rate of capacity utilization, will lead to a further decline in the 
rate of expansion as net investment is reduced. Individual firms, by 
believing (in another striking example of the "fallacy of composition") 
that decreases in their own investment will alleviate their own burden 
of excess capacity, merely intensify the problem economy-wide. The 
greater the proportion of the nation's industry that is highly concen 
trated, the greater the tendency for a cyclical downturn to develop into 
a progressive (and seemingly endless) decline.
A further consequence of the existence of highly concentrated sec 
tors in the national economy is the impact it has on effective demand. 
The higher profit margins secured by large firms are indicative of an 
increasingly skewed distribution of output that, when combined with 
the reluctance of firms to invest (or otherwise spend) their revenues, 
generates a rising aggregate marginal propensity to save. Declining 
effective demand is combined with rising excess capacity when a 
slump occurs. The potential for recovery, barring the intervention of
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exogenous shocks, government spending, or the penetration of foreign 
markets, is therefore greatly lessened.
What is central to Steindl's thesis is the conception of long-term 
alterations in industrial structure that make the economy as a whole 
more incapable both of recovering from cyclical instability and of gen 
erating continued growth. The emergence of oligopolistic market 
structure is taken to be inherent in the process of capitalist develop 
ment insofar as that process is coterminous with the development of 
large-scale manufacturing techniques and of financial concentration. 
Economic maturity and the threat of stagnation result because the 
growing incidence of "[oligopoly brings about a maldistribution of 
funds by shifting profits to those industries that are reluctant to use 
them."30 In order to escape stagnation, capital must be redistributed 
either to more competitive sectors or new industries, although such 
shifts can only proceed (given the difficulties of obtaining technical 
knowledge and good will in new product lines) with considerable time 
lags.
Indeed, during the Great Depression, some members of 
Roosevelt's "Brain Trust," such as Rexford Tugwell, argued forcefully 
for the imposition of an "undistributed profits tax" to prevent the accu 
mulation of corporate surpluses and to stop the privilege firms had 
always enjoyed of investing their surpluses at will. The incentive of 
the tax, it was claimed, would lead firms to issue more of their sur 
pluses in the form of productive investment commitments or in the 
form of dividends. There would thus obtain either direct productive 
expenditure, through firm-level investment or the allocation of funds to 
stockholders that would then be subject to the discipline of private cap 
ital markets. As a result, the mobilization of capital resources would 
be more efficient and more likely to generate recovery. Embedded in 
the Revenue Act of 1936, the undistributed profits tax proved to be one 
of the most unpopular and controversial pieces of legislation to emerge 
from the New Deal; it was repealed in 1938. 31
Interestingly enough, no clear relationship exists between stagna 
tion and concentration in American industry during the Great Depres 
sion. By applying a static conception of market structure, investigators 
have tended to focus on the number of firms in an industry as the pri 
mary determinant of a sector's competitiveness. The difficulty lies in 
the fact that cross-section data on firm numbers provide no information
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concerning those differentials in costs that are the basis of pricing strat 
egies. Given large disparities in techniques and costs, it is possible that 
a small number of enterprises may, over time, engage in large amounts 
of competition. Conversely, a sector with a large number of identical 
firms may prove to be quite lethargic, given the absence of cost differ 
entials that can be competitively exploited. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
the historical record of the 1930s seemingly does not give Steindl's 
argument unqualified support.
As I demonstrated in my 1987 book, The Great Depression: 
Delayed Recovery and Economic Change in America, 1929-1939, 
some highly concentrated industries were relatively vibrant during the 
decade, while others less so appeared virtually moribund. 32 In addi 
tion, the data on sectoral shares of wages in the value added, which 
Steindl cited as indices of competitiveness, were similarly mislead 
ing. 33 A rising (falling) trend in the wage-share may not necessarily 
indicate a competitive decline (noncompetitive rise) in the industry's 
gross margin, but rather may demonstrate changes in the labor inten 
sity of that sector's technology over time. Clearly, the evidence con 
cerning market structure was a frail reed upon which Steindl attempted 
to base his theory. Whether a given industry is dynamic or not involves 
several issues that are not directly linked with numbers of firms or the 
extent of capital concentration—issues having to do with the industry's 
position in the economy's input-output matrix, the durability of its out 
put, and the relative maturity of the industry with respect to the shifting 
composition of the economy as a whole.
The weaknesses in Steindl's analysis do not, of course, obscure the 
importance of his contribution to an understanding of the Great 
Depression in particular and of maturity in capitalist economies in gen 
eral. That importance derives from the fact that Steindl attempted to 
situate the decade of the 1930s within a larger historical framework. In 
this context, he could view the Great Depression as the outcome of an 
interaction between cyclical forces dating from 1929 and tendencies of 
long-run development spanning a half-century or more. In short, he 
was thus able to understand the Great Depression as a historical prob 
lem.
Steindl's conception of long-term capitalist development was obvi 
ously embedded within a theoretical tradition linked with the work of 
the classical economic theorists—Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and
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Karl Marx. That tradition posited the concentration of capital as the 
major expression of secular growth. To attempt to grasp capitalist 
development in terms of the increasing concentration of capital, as the 
classical theorists and Steindl did, it was necessary to locate the pri 
mary determinants of growth in the production process itself—i.e., in 
the firm. Changes in the role of markets—markets being defined as 
both loci of purchasing power and as collections of needs for specific 
kinds of goods—had no place in the theory. 34
Conceptually, capitalist economies may avoid (and, in the latter 
half of this century, have avoided) tendencies toward stagnation 
through exogenous stimuli such as war, territorial expansion, interna 
tional monetary networks that privilege some industrial systems rela 
tive to others, and of course through product innovation and technical 
change. Indeed, it is this last potential avenue for expansion that has 
been both common in fact and most germane to the extension of the 
neo-Keynesian, neo-Marxian, and neo-Ricardian theoretical frame 
works. Even so, such compositional transformations in modern econo 
mies occasion a great deal of instability and unpredictability in 
performance.
Secular changes in the growth performance and potential of vari 
ous industries must offset declines in certain groups with rises in oth 
ers. The chance that such changes in sectoral performance will 
proceed smoothly is small, and economic history provides ample testi 
mony to this fact. 35 While the possibility of terminal stagnation has not 
been realized in advanced capitalist states, economic performance in 
those economies throughout the last four decades of this century has 
nevertheless been erratic at times and often premised more on external 
developments than internal mechanisms of recovery and expansion.
Secular transitions in development involve the decline of old 
industries and the rise of new ones. These alterations in the composi 
tion of national output tend to be discontinuous and disruptive, not 
because of imperfections in markets but rather because of forces inher 
ent in the accumulation of capital over time. First, the ongoing expan 
sion of the capitalist economy is coterminous with the advance of 
scientific and technical knowledge, which transforms production tech 
niques, cost structures, and the availability of raw materials, and which 
creates entirely new inputs and outputs. Consider, for example, the 
emergence of fossil fuels, the replacement of natural fibers with syn-
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thetics, and the rise of internal combustion as a means of locomotion. 
Entire industries are made obsolete or virtually so, while new ones are 
created. Second, the structural milieu in which product and technical 
changes take place is itself a product of economic growth.
Concentration of capital may lead to unequal access to investment 
funds, which obstructs further the possibility of easy transitions in 
industrial activity. Because of their past record of profitability, large 
enterprises have higher credit ratings and easier access to credit facili 
ties, and they are able to put up larger collateral for a loan. Equity 
issues by such firms are more readily financed and sold, and such firms 
can avoid takeovers more easily than small firms. Large firms, too, 
may have commonalities of interest with financial institutions through 
interlocking directorates. All these factors may impede the flow of 
capital out of old and into new sectors, thereby making shortfalls in 
aggregate economic performance much worse.
Compositional and structural change in economies may also pre 
cipitate serious unemployment problems that interfere with the 
achievement of full capacity output. New industries may have differ 
ing capital intensities and skill requirements, relative to older sectors, 
that complicate (or possibly even prevent) the absorption of unem 
ployed workers. The problem may be twofold: newer industries may 
not grow fast enough to provide employment opportunities for those 
laid off in older sectors; but even if higher growth rates are achieved, 
the newer industries may require different amounts and altogether dif 
ferent kinds of labor for their production. Structural unemployment 
may be the troubling and persistent consequence. These were, in fact, 
many of the specific findings of my research on the Great Depression 
reported over the past decade.
Finally, changes in the relationship of a national economy to the 
world economic system may also be responsible for wide fluctuations 
in macroeconomic behavior. A resurgence of competition from other 
national systems previously excluded from or inadequately prepared 
for international commerce may seriously affect the fortunes of domes 
tic industries grown used to protected or exclusive markets. Transfor 
mations in international currency systems, whereby a nation's 
monetary unit that had previously served as numeraire and means of 
international clearance is rapidly integrated into a general floating cur 
rency system, will also profoundly change the performance character-
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istics of that economy. Inflationary pressures at home now may 
translate into an export boom as a currency is devalued, while defla 
tionary patterns may yield an upswing in imports to the detriment of 
domestic producers. Policy flexibility and independence may also be 
constrained as a nation's economy becomes more open to economies 
elsewhere. Domestic changes in fiscal and monetary policy will now 
have international trade consequences as well. Modulations of interest 
rates, for example, will affect the flow of capital across national bor 
ders as investors compare rates of return in various nations. Interest 
ingly enough, Keynes himself suggested to Roy Harrod in 1942 that 
"the whole management of the domestic economy depends upon being 
free to have the appropriate rate of interest without reference to the 
rates prevailing elsewhere in the world. Capital control is a corollary 
to this."36
National economic performance may also, in a mature setting, 
require increasing involvement of the state itself. Maintaining suffi 
cient outlets for net investment expenditure might possibly involve def 
icit spending to bolster effective demand, direct government purchases 
of goods and services (particularly of public goods such as infrastruc 
ture and military and law-enforcement equipment), and government 
oversight of the penetration of foreign markets. These efforts might 
conceivably be paralleled by rising outlays by private firms on sales 
efforts, distribution mechanisms, and various means to enhance con 
sumer credit. 37 While for most neoclassical economic theorists, fiscal 
and monetary mechanisms stand as instruments of periodic counter 
cyclical policy, for neo-Keynesian, neo-Marxian, and neo-Ricardian 
economists, governmental involvement in mature economies is a per 
manent (and ever-increasing) feature of modern industrial states.
Steindl had, of course, focused his work on the inter-war economic 
crisis of the 1930s. His central theses regarding maturity and stagna 
tion in advanced capitalist economies seemed particularly compelling 
when viewed in terms of the long-run historical experience of the Great 
Depression. Yet both the postwar record, at least in the case of the 
United States, and some of the theoretical lacunae in his earlier claims 
led Steindl to modify some of the arguments of his 1952 book. With 
the 1976 republication of his Maturity and Stagnation in American 
Capitalism, Steindl allowed that technical innovation, product develop 
ment, public spending, and research and development initiatives might
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provide the means to escape from investment inertia. Even so, he was 
extremely concerned that most accumulation strategies in mature capi 
talist nations would be focused on military-industrial activity and war 
itself. Using both public and private investment funds for other pur 
poses, while obviously desirable, would be "exceedingly hard" given 
"the workings of political institutions."38
The wisdom (not to mention the prescience) of Steindl's 1976 
observations is made apparent as soon as one surveys the more recent 
evolution of American capitalism. American accumulation in the latter 
half of this century has, on the one side, confirmed many of Steindl's 
suppositions regarding expansion in advanced industrial states. On the 
other, it has demonstrated both the unique and abiding flexibility of 
capitalism in the face of contradictory tendencies toward underutiliza- 
tion and the importance (even at times the possible centrality) of politi 
cal and social forces often understood by economists to be exogenous. 
In all these respects, contemporary history portrays the conceptual 
power and importance of what Steindl had to say when he first exam 
ined the crisis of the 1930s. But it also reminds us of the unyielding 
impacts of contingency and human agency in economic performance 
over time.
World War II had achieved in the United States, of course, what the 
New Deal could not—economic recovery. With the start of war in 
Europe, the unemployment rate had already begun to fall, so that by the 
time of the Japanese naval offensive at Pearl Harbor, only 7 percent of 
the labor force remained idle. American entry into the war brought 
almost instantaneous resolution of the persistent economic difficulties 
of the inter-war years. Between 1939 and 1944, the national product, 
measured in current dollars, increased by almost 125 percent, ulti 
mately rising to $212 billion by 1945.
Yet as World War II came to a close, many economists and busi 
ness people worried about the possibility of a drop in the level of pros 
perity and employment to one far below that of the war. But these 
apprehensions proved to be unwarranted. 39 By 1946, gross national 
product fell less than the postwar reduction in government spending; 
unemployment did not even reach 4 percent; consumer spending did 
not fall at all, and eventually rose dramatically. Although recessions 
occurred between 1945 and the mid 1970s, most of them lasted only 
about a year or less, and none of them remotely approached the sever-
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ity of the Great Depression of the 1930s. During these three decades, 
American output steadily increased, with only minor setbacks. 
According to the Federal Reserve Board's index, manufacturing pro 
duction doubled between 1945 and 1965, and tripled between 1945 
and 1976.
Such robust economic performance is hardly surprising in war 
time—especially when conflict is global and, with a few exceptions, 
kept outside of national boundaries. What is most striking about the 
American economic experience linked with World War II was the 
enduring growth and prosperity of the postwar years. Consumption 
and investment behavior played a major part in this great prosperity of 
the late 1940s and 1950s. As soon as Germany and Japan had surren 
dered, private and foreign investment in the United States rose quickly. 
On the domestic side, reconversion was itself an investment stimulus. 
Modernization and deferred replacement projects required renewed 
and large deployments of funds. Profound scarcities of consumer 
goods, the production of which had been long postponed by wartime 
mobilization needs, necessitated major retooling and expansion efforts. 
Even fear of potentially high inflation, emerging in the wake of the dis 
mantling of the price and wage controls of the war years, prompted 
many firms to move forward the date of ambitious and long-term 
investment projects. On the foreign side, both individuals and govern 
ments were eager to find a refuge for capital that had been in virtual 
hiding during the war itself. Along with a jump in domestic invest 
ment, therefore, a large capital inflow began in late 1945 and early 
1946.
Domestic consumption was the second major component of post 
war growth. Bridled demand and high household savings due to war 
time shortages, rationing, and controls, coupled with the generous 
wage rates of the high-capacity war economy, all contributed to a dra 
matic growth in consumer spending at war's end. The jump in dispos 
able income was bolstered by the rapid reduction in wartime surtaxes 
and excises. And the baby boom of the wartime generation expressed 
itself economically in high levels of demand for significant items like 
appliances, automobiles, and housing. G.I. Bill benefits additionally 
served to increase the demand for housing and such things as educa 
tional services, with associated impacts on construction and other 
industrial sectors.
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Foreign demand for American exports grew rapidly in the immedi 
ate postwar years. In part, the needs of devastated areas could only be 
met by the one industrial base that had been nearly untouched by war- 
related destruction. Explicit policy commitments to the rebuilding of 
allied and occupied territories, such as the Marshall Plan in Europe, 
also served to increase the foreign market for the output of American 
industry. Even so, one of the most significant contexts within which 
the impressive postwar growth of the American economy took place 
was the unique and special set of arrangements developed for interna 
tional trade at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.
When the allied nation's financial ministers gathered at Bretton 
Woods in New Hampshire just before the war's end, they were con 
cerned to reconfigure world trade and financial flows such that the dis 
putes so characteristic of the inter-war years of 1919-1939 could be 
avoided and stability maintained. Along with the creation of an Inter 
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of an Interna 
tional Monetary Fund, the conference decided to establish fixed 
exchange rates between the U.S. dollar and all other internationally 
traded currencies. The value of the dollar itself was set in terms of 
gold at $35 per ounce. This installed a benchmark against which the 
value of all other currencies was measured. As the American economy 
was, by far, the most powerful at the time, it seemed prudent and 
indeed necessary that its currency play such a central international role.
American postwar prosperity and the benefits of world economic 
leadership continued throughout most of the 1950s. The added fiscal 
stimulus of the Korean War also helped to maintain the high levels of 
growth and employment characteristic of the decade. Republican Pres 
ident Dwight Eisenhower, carrying on in the tradition of his Demo 
cratic predecessor Harry Truman, repeatedly committed his admin 
istration to the practice of compensatory demand management. But the 
prosperity of the 1950s, while robust and impressive, nevertheless 
weakened by 1957. This set the stage for the arrival of a new brand of 
economics in Washington, explicitly (and self-consciously) imbued 
with the doctrines of Keynesianism.
From the "New Frontier" policies of John Kennedy, to the "Great 
Society" agenda of his successor Lyndon Johnson, through the declara 
tion of a "New Federalism" by Richard Nixon, there ensued an era of 
sustained central government intervention in the nation's economic
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life. The self-assurance of many (but not all) of the "new" economists 
of the early 1960s that the goal of achieving simultaneously acceptable 
levels of unemployment and inflation could be realized has more 
recently been shattered. But throughout the 1960s and much of the 
1970s, and for some even during the 1980s, the perceived obligation of 
government to secure overall economic stability was not seriously 
questioned and remained one of the more important changes of 20th- 
century American economic history.
Historical specificity notwithstanding, American economic perfor 
mance in the latter half of this century appears to conform in many 
major respects to the general analytical propositions derived from a 
secular analysis of inter-war economics. The ability to forestall and/or 
overcome tendencies toward economic stagnation has depended upon a 
varied and uncommon set of circumstances both global and domestic 
in their genesis and impact. But a continuation of such a charmed 
existence is apparently no longer possible. Josef Steindl himself noted, 
in 1976, that "the cheerful extroverted era of [postwar] growth has 
apparently come to an end." He held that the reasons for this were "the 
reduction of tension between the superpowers . . . the increase in ten 
sion within the capitalist countries . . . and . . . the emergence of envi 
ronment, raw material, and energy problems . . ." And, in words that 
today seem as apposite as they did over 20 years ago, Steindl noted that
the political and psychological basis of the postwar boom has been 
sapped by such developments as these: public spending ... [has] 
decreased . . . the competition in technology . . . and education 
unleashed by Sputnik has flagged; the development in these fields 
has been dominated instead by [an] internal reaction against intel 
lectuals and youth... the cooperation between the capitalist pow 
ers has broken down . . . [and] the internal stresses of groups 
contending for shares in the national income have shown them 
selves [to be] inflationary.40
In the midst of a return to the weak and intermittent growth of ear 
lier decades of this century, there has also obtained an altogether reac 
tionary (re)orientation of fiscal and monetary policy. A resurgence of 
general equilibrium approaches to cyclical phenomena has prompted 
the formulation of a "new classical macroeconomics" and the rise of a 
"rational expectations school."41 These intellectual developments, 
linked with political events having to do with the backlash against the
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progressive politics and redistributive programs of the New Frontier 
and the Great Society, eliminated Keynesian thinking from the formu 
lation of responses to contemporary economic problems. Thus, we 
have the more recent attempts to balance fiscal expenditures (and, until 
recently, tighten monetary variables) in the face of unemployment and 
shortfalls in national product. In other words, we witness an attempt to 
embrace what Keynes once derisively called "the Treasury View."42
There is, of course, a major difference between past decades and 
today in this regard, at least in the United States. Timid countercyclical 
policy in the inter-war period was to some extent the result of igno 
rance and misplaced confidence in old remedies. Today, slow-growth 
policies are derived from the politics of reaction and resentment—a 
politics arrayed against the reformist agendas and civil rights initiatives 
of the 1960s. Whatever its social and cultural roots, this revanchist 
spirit has grounded its appeal, to a broad segment of the American 
electorate, in the pessimism and antagonism attendant upon erratic 
economic growth since the oil price shocks and hyperinflation of the 
1970s. As the macroeconomic "pie" has grown more slowly and less 
consistently, distributional struggles—often deployed along racial, eth 
nic, and gender lines—have become more intense. Insofar as the 
national economy falls short of a full-employment approximation of 
potential output, the justifications for reversing the distributional gains 
of the activist fiscal policies of the 1960s gain ever greater force. To 
put it in the words of Josef Steindl once again, contemporary "argu 
ments against full employment have got the upper hand in the councils 
of the powers, and thus we witness stagnation not as an incomprehensi 
ble fate, as in the 1930s, but stagnation as a policy."43 The ironies and 
the poignancy of this state of contemporary affairs are made strikingly 
clear as soon as we reflect upon the Great Depression as a significant 
and coherent historical problem.44
Notes
1. For an exposition of the business confidence argument, see Morgan (1935).
2. See Fisher (1930, 1932). Also see Schumpeter (1946), Roepke (1936), Noyes 
(1930), Persons (1930), and Viner (1936). The notion of excessive speculation 
and "wild" stock prices was challenged by Sirkin (1975). Lionel Robbins (1934) 
argued that the crash itself may have been generated by attempts by the Federal
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ing pressures on sterling.
3. See Temin (1976) for a contemporary statement of this view. Also see Mishkin 
(1978).
4. See Cassel( 1932, p. 76).
5. See Galbraith (1972, pp. 93, 192). Also compare Lewis (1950). The fact that the 
economy had significantly weakened before the crash was demonstrated by 
Moore (1950). Also see Erickson (1972).
6. As most forcefully explained by Temin (1976).
7. For a more recent statement, see Weinstein (1980). Also see Brockie (1950).
8. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Warburton (1944, 1945a, 1945b, 1946).
9. See Roose (1948, 1954) and Slichter (1938).
10. I have surveyed much of this literature (published in English, and as it applied to 
the United States experience) in Bernstein (1985).
11. See Harris (1948), Sweezy (1968), Lewis (1950, pp. 55-56), Kindleberger (1973, 
pp. 292-293), and Timoshenko (1933, pp. 541-543).
12. See, for example, Means (1935) and Means and Berle (1968).
13. See Reynolds (1939) and Thorp and Crowder (1941). Interestingly enough, 
Backman (1939) challenged the empirical relevance of the administered prices 
theory and argued (on p. 486) that in order to understand the low levels of output 
that prevailed during the 1930s, one had to examine the "character of the market; 
durability of the product; capital goods versus consumers' goods; joint demand, 
stage of development of an industry; [and] necessaries versus luxury products."
14. See Kalecki (1969, pp. 40-59).
15. See U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, part 2, series U201-206, p. 887).
16. See Schumpeter (1939, vol. 2, pp. 905-1050). '
17. SeeAbramovitz(1961,p. 241).
18. See Kuznets (1958), Abramovitz (1961), and Easterlin (1968).
19. As suggested by William Fellner (1954). It should be pointed out that Fellner had 
earlier rejected all arguments concerning stagnation on the grounds that none of 
their propositions could be formulated in behavioral terms. See Fellner (1941).
20. The quotations are taken from McLaughlin and Watkins (1939, pp. 1-14).
21. See Hansen (1939) and Keynes (1937). A complete, if rather polemical exposi 
tion of the stagnation thesis may be found in Terborgh (1945).
22. From Kalecki (1943, p. 88). Also see Sweezy (1940).
23. From Terborgh (1945, p. 181).
24. See Hansen (1941, p. 279ff) and Kalecki (1962). Kalecki did concede, on pp. 134 
and 147, that innovations might not be wholly exogenous and might, in fact, be 
influenced (with appreciable lags) by changes in profit rates, output, and the size of 
the capital stock. Even so, he also argued, elsewhere, that the exogeneity of tech 
nical change indicated that "long-run development [was] not inherent in the capi 
talist economy." See Kalecki (1968, p. 161).
25. As admitted by Kalecki (1971, p. 30).
26. Hansen (1941, pp. 310, 314-315). See also Kalecki (1968, p. 159).
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27. The following exposition, both textual and graphic, is derived from Steindl (1976, 
Chapters 2-5, 9, 13) and Steindl (1945, pp. 48-54, 63-66). The idea that large 
concentrated firms eschew major investment opportunities, owing to a desire to 
maintain their dominant market position, also played a role in the conception of 
economic stagnation developed by Michal Kalecki. See Kalecki (1943, p. 92) and 
Kalecki (1968, p. 159).
28. This particular assertion obviously ties in with the kinked demand curve theory of 
oligopoly. See, for example, Sweezy (1939).
29. See Tobin (1975). This counter-intuitive price effect was named after Roger 
Blough, then head of the United States Steel Corporation.
30. From Steindl (1976, p. xv).
31. See Bernstein (1987, pp. 190-191).
32. Explicit documentation for these claims may be found in Bernstein (1982, Chap 
ters 3-4).
33. See Steindl (1976, Chapter 8).
34. This is not to say that these theorists did not address the problem of effective 
demand, but rather that their conception of the role of markets was fairly limited 
in scope. Steindl, in particular, did not fully consider the effect of investment 
strategies geared toward product diversification and sales efforts.
35. See, for example, Aldcroft (1977), Bernstein (1987), Dahmen (1970), and 
Svennilson (1954).
36. See Crotty (1983, pp. 59-65) and Keynes (1980, pp. 148-149). Also see Keynes 
(1933) and Williamson (1985).
37. Steindl, at one point, noted that expanded systems of consumer credit were a 
means by which investment opportunities could be maintained in mature econo 
mies. See Steindl (1966).
38. See Steindl (1976, pp. xii-xiii).
39. In fact, it was this dramatic postwar economic performance, one that seemingly 
belied the stagnation theories of the inter-war years, that in part prompted 
Steindl to open the new introduction to the 1976 edition of Maturity and Stagna 
tion with the observation that "[t]he first (1952) edition of this book appeared at 
a time which could not have been less propitious for its success." See Steindl 
(1976, p. ix).
40. From Steindl (1976, pp. xvi-xvii).
41. See, for significant and influential examples, Lucas (1975, 1977). Also see 
Steindl (1984).
42. The "Treasury View," that fiscal spending could not lower unemployment, 
emerged in Great Britain in 1929 in response to Liberal Party calls for more activ 
ist policy. See Bernstein (1987, p. 218).
43. From Steindl (1976, p. xvii). On the political constraints within which counter 
cyclical policy is often formulated, see the pathbreaking essay of Kalecki (1972). 
Also of interest in this regard are Nordhaus (1975) and Fair (1978).
44. With apologies to my friend and colleague Arno J. Mayer (1975).
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